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Critique of pure Reasoner

Essays and commentary related to topics in Tom Reasoner's "Truth and Beauty" blog

Friday, July 02, 2004

Essences and selves

A river drains a certain mountain valley, over time etching its way sinuously this way and that, not occupying quite the same cartographic location from year to year, and certainly not carrying the same water, yet we would call it the same name. Are we deluding ourselves in thinking it's the same river?

Of course, we're all aware that the river changes from year to year. Last year there was a copse of trees on the side of the river and now it's a farm, and we might remark on how the river has changed. But it's the same river that has changed.

What if there's a powerful earthquake that causes some mountain landslides, changing the course of water flow dramatically? Is it still the same river? It still drains approximately the same area. I think we usually would, especially considering that human engineering projects have generated some of the same sort of catastrophic changes without us changing the name of the river(s) involved.

What if we go back to the ice ages? It'll be pretty hard to identify which rivers we see are the younger (ancestral? analogous? terminology here depends on you favored answer) form of our rivers of today. Should we give them the same names? What about if we go all the way back to Pangaea?

One could argue all day long about this, but it's clear it's an issue of efficiency and preference because there's no fact of the matter, only nomenclature. We need not announce that rivers are nothing more than comforting illusions because there's no river essence to which our names firmly attach. Rivers are real and persistent in ways we care about. Only if one insists on weird forms of river essentialism does any of this become a worry.

Is a man the 'same' man after a severe stroke? An earthquake has happened in his head, dramatically diverting his 'self' all at once. It's more tempting to call him a different purpose with a nice sharp division like that, but I think we'll consider him 'same enough' to carry his old name for similar types of reasons that we'd continue to call the earthquake-diverted river by the same name. Which way is the best way is a matter for moral and social analysis, but there's no fact of the matter to discover out in the physical world.

We are accustomed to vague ideas of the soul that include some sort of essence that carries the core of our being that we care about. When people criticise the hypothesis of the soul or its essentialist analogs, people often feel like the critic is trying to say there's nothing we care about, or what we care about is only a comfortable illusion. Well, one way to make sure the baby's thrown out with the bathwater is to conflate them. SO let's not. Let's agree our individualism exists, our selves exist, there are plenty of good reasons we carry our names from day to day, and none of it requires an "essence" of us.

That said, the above leaves open the possibility of discontinuities that might challenge our judgement in fringe cases. They are moral quandries with no clear right answer, which is uncomfortable. However, it's our duty to try and find the best answer we can instead of holding out for a essence to decide the question.

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