Materialism and freewill

As Nathanaelpoints out, the concept of agency is vital to any moral system. If materialism is incompatible with freewill, than there can be no materialist morals. Fortunately, this is very far from the case. Compatibilism, the position that freewill and determinism are not in opposition, is age-old and well respected, though not universally accepted. I actually stumbled onto a primitive version of it myself in the course of writing a paper evaluating William James' pragmatism.

Years later I read Daniel Dennett's elegant (if initially unappreciated because it was in certain ways too far ahead of its time) book "Elbow Room: Varieties of Freewill Worth Wanting." Until then I had been tolerably rpoud of my stance avec James, but Dennett's discussion... well, I've bought that book four times now, because I have been overcome now and again with the burning desire to read portions of it again, especially the chapter "Could Have Done Otherwise." It remains the most beautiful bit of philosophy I've ever read.

"The Intentional Stance" might be a necessary companion book to address technical concerns that tend to occur to analytical philosophers, but it's not necessary and it's very much Dennett's dryest and most difficult book. On the other hand, the Intentional Stance was considered quite formidable and has had huge influence.


In any case, though, there's nothing I can say that "Elbow Room" doesn't say better. And I still have one spare, if Nathanael wants it.